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An Examination of the Human Factors Support of NASA's Safety Directorate
on the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF)
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
H. Greig Llndner
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
ABSTRACT

The goal of the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) pilot projeet undertaken by NASA on the
Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, is to demonstrate
the advantages of using Human Factors to support NASA Safety. The primary objective of the
project is to demonstrate how Human Factors can assist in decreasing the causes of accidents
by reducing error producing situations. The project began with a review of design drawings for
the SSPF, in which all Human Factors (HF) concerns were identified especially those that
affected personnel safety, payload protection, and operational efficiency. Visits to other KSC
facilities produced insights that could be applied to the drawing critiques when the drawings
were not sufficient to disclose how the facility's characteristics would fulfill operational needs.
Overall, the drawing review revealed a broad range of HF and Safety concerns. When possible,
these concerns were discussed with the appropriate engineering personnel to effect workable
solutions. To date, some of these HF & Safety concerns have been resolved by incorporating
HF principles. Thus, this project has reduced potential problems that can contribute to
accidents and costly delays, such as the Magellan Spacecraft incident in October of 1988.
This incident typifies payload processing problems that can develop unexpectedly within any
processing facility when Human Factors issues are either ignored or overlooked in the initial
design of the spacecraft or in developing appropriate service and checkout procedures.
Although the problem occurred on a spacecraft, this type of problem also could easily occur
within a processing facility, on payloads that are being processed, or on the ground support
equipment being used to process the payloads. In addition, this projeet has led to the evaluation
of candidate methods for the implementation of HF. Among these, a means of conducting HF
evaluations during Engineering Prototyping in a Computer Aided Design environment. This
innovative technique is expected to demonstrate the Safety adv!lntage and substantial cost
savings of incorporating HF principles.
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Human Factors Engineering applied to
NASA's Space Station Processing Facility
Although many of the systems being developed for NASA embrace leading edge technologies, some of those developed for ground based
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facilities do not. Currently, systems found in
ground based facilities lack documented policy
guides that ensure the application of Human
Factors (HF) or the use of ergonomically designed equipment. These systems should benefit from the application of HF standards

because the standards can reduce the likelihood ofaccidents and injuries. These deficiencies were recognized by KSC personnel as far
back as the early 1970s when Design Engineering tried to alleviate this concern by establishing its own documentation guidelines,
in a Guide for Design Engineering of
Ground Support Equipment and Facilities for Use at Kennedy Space Center
(KSC-DE-512-SM) (1). This document attempts to address some of the Human Engineering issues of concern. The few HF paragraphs in this document may be contrasted
with the comprehensive treatment found in
MIL-STD-1472D(9). Compoundingthisproblem is the lack of skilled Human Factors
personnel at KSC to implement the
st.andards of either KSC-DE-512-SM (1) or
MIL-STD-14720 (9).
To determine how Human Factors standards
can augment safety in ground-based facilities, NASA KSC began a Human Factors
Engineering (HFE) pilot project in the Space
Station Processing Facility (SSPF). This
project, which began in 1991, demonstrates
the supportive role of HF in reducing accidents caused by human error.
To reduce human error and make systems
more effective, Human Factors principles can
be applied to system design by using features
such as ergonomically designed displays, controls, and environments; performance aids,
appropriate labels, and fail-safe characteristics. These features accommodate human
limitations and enhance human abilities
thereby increasing the overall system safety.
When HF is applied to design, it assists Safety
in achieving objectives such as: eliminating
potential hazards, reducing risks, increasing
operational safety, and eliminating personnel injuries. Through this supportive role,
Human Factors enhances operational efficiency by reducing accidents that are due to
human error.
Procedure
We have completed or will complete the following activities to identify Human Engineering(HE) design deficiencies and/or safety
1. Review the System Design Drawings of
the Space Station Processing Facility
(SSPF)to Identify Man-System Interfaces
or Relationships that pose potential
hazards

2. Identify potential Safety problems and or
areas of concern
3. Identify potential Human Errors in Operational Procedures
4. Visit other facilities at KSC to observe
similar operations and to obtain Lessons
Learned insights
5. Participate in an Operating and Support
Hazard Analysis
6. Participate in a Preliminary Hazard
Analysis
7. Conduct a Critical Task Analysis
8. Conduct an Engineering System Analysis
OnceSafetyissuesweredocumented, we identified applicable Human Factors issues and
findings using MIL-STD-14720 (9), NASASTD-3000 (2), the Human Engineering Handbook for Safety Assurance, [NSSl740JCX] (4),
and other applicable HF Resources. Then, we
reassessed the beneficial aspects of applying
HF to specific concerns of Safety within the
SSPF. Following this, we reexamined the
guidelines in the Human Engineering Handbook for Safety Assurance (4) to see if the
requested HF data is effectively supplementing the ongoing safety analyses in a timely
manner. This is a rare opportunity to test the
guidelines of the policies being stated in this
Handbook prior to its official publication.
Results
The initial phase of our endeavor consisted of
a review of design drawings for the SSPF. In
this review we identified all human factors
concerns with special emphasis on those that
affected personnel safety, payload protection,
and operational efficiency. When drawings
did not completely disclose how the facility's
characteristics would fulfill the intended operational needs, we then visited other facilities at KSC to obtain insights that could be
applied to the drawing critique.
Although our objective was to identify HF and
Safety oversights in the SSPF, we did identify
some very effective HE and Safety features.
For example, Figure 1 shows the positive
design features of the vertical access ladders
within the facility to the crane walkways.
This design incorporates Human Engineering design principles as stated in MIL-STD14720 (9) and the Safety guidelines in the
OSHA section of the Federal Register. These
ladders were designed to incorporate two
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safety features: the cage, and a rest platform
at the prescribed height.
The original Human Fact:Drs' chart.er was t.D
identify both positive and negative examples
of the application of Human Factors. Later,
the emphasis was shifted to concentrate on
the lack of Human Fact:Drs or the Human
Factors oversights. Other positive examples
of good Human Engineering practices were
uncovered, but our chart.er as restated was to
focus on the discovery and identification of
the HF and Safety oversights, and many of
the positive examples remain undocumented .
However, our review of the System Design
Drawings has revealed a variety of Safety/
Human Factors problems relating to both
operability and maintainability issues in the
SSPF. To date, the most serious problem
discovered originates from the design of the
SSPF module processing layout and service
area (Figures 2A & B and Figures 3A & B).
The service area was designed with a CAD
system, in which one "footprint" was created
and then flipped repeatedly, to produce eight
"footprints". Identical foot prints are depicted
by similar shading (Figure 2A). These footprints have mirror image symmetry, so identical gaseous stub-ups to the right side as
personnel face the foot print (service area) are
to the left side in reverse order when they face
a different service area (Figure 2B). Because
all stub-ups have similar fittings which appear identical, they are easy to confuse and
could pose serious high pressure li ne
mismating problems and hazards. For example, potential high pressure line mating
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mistakes could be made when a technician
works on one "footprint" and then moves to
another "footprint" where stub-up layouts are
reversed. Since at each of the gaseous stubups locations, high pressure hoses are connected t.D lines supplying gaseous nitrogen or
helium at 6000, 3000 or 750 PSIG, attaching
a line t.D the incorrect source at the wrong
delivery pressure could be disastrous
(Figure 3A).
After presentation of these findings to NASA,
it was discovered that corrective steps had
already been taken t.D eliminate the potential
mismating errors.
In addition, our investigation of the design
drawings revealed a variety of other Safety
and Maintenance problems in the SSPF that
could have been/be corrected with the application of relevant HF guidelines (Figure 4).
Figures 5 & 6 illustrate examples of safety
problems. Figure 5 shows an access walkway
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Seleciecl Example• or HF£ Drawing Review on
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Figure 38 Stub-up Hardware and Leyout, Depicting the
750, 3000, and 6000 PSIG GN2/GHe Feed Line
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where the incline angle of the ramp exceeds
the incline allowable (using acceptable HF
guidelines) by ten degrees. Figure 6 illustrates sharp corners on a stair handrail. Both
of these figures show hazards that can cause
an accident or injury.
Human Factors applied to design results in
efficient and easily maint.ained equipment
and environments. However, the failure to
apply HF principles can lead to overlooking a
number of problems. Maintenance problems
of both old and new equipment were discovered in the System Drawings Review (Figure
7-9). For example, a thirty-year-old overhead
crane that resides in a clean-room environment poses several maintenance problems
(Figure 7).This crane had no room for an oil
drip pan under the oil drain plug, making oil
removal very difficult. Before design modifi-
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cations were incorporated, five to eight gallons ofoil were drained into Glad plastic trash
bags, transferred to buckets, and lowered to
the ground 100 feet below. During this procedure, maintenance personnel were required
to adhere to strict clean room requirements.

Elevation
Typical Railing Details
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Similar Human Engineeringdeficiencies have
been enoount.ered in recently purchased equipment.
AB Figure 8 and 9 illustrate, the equipment
custom designed and purchased recently al~o
posesoperationalmaintenanceproblems. This
crane provides operators an inch and a half
of clearance between the bottom of the gear
case and the hardware protective oil drip pan.
This clearanCe is inadequate for routine oil
drainage. However, without major design
modifications, thisequipmentcould have provided maintenance crews with more clearance. For example, the relocation ofan electrical connector to the other side of the electrical
case would have allowed the oil drip pan to be
lowered 3 to 4 inches, providing the needed
clearance.
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A correctable Problem

From Figure 9, another clearance deficiency
is apparent. A motor support cross member
that has been positioned under the gear case
near the oil drain plug further restricts the
clearance making it difficult for maintenance
to perform essential oil changes.
Discussion
To date, our investigation of the ~PF has
revealed a number of Safety & Mamtenance
Problems. These problems are a product of
limited human factors input and NASA's preferred policy of purchasing commercial offthe-shelf items (COTS).
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1. Currently, there is no definitive NASA
policy guidance documentation for the broad
application of HF standards and specifications to support the development of new
sysU!ms and facilities. Thus, ground based
facilities have minimum ergonomic design.

In an effort 00 standardize the application of
Human FacOOrs and/or Human Engineering
within organizations under DOD the following were developed: various DOD directives,
(e.g., 5000.1, 5000.2, 5000.3 (6, 7, & 8)],
along with a definitive Military Specification, [e.g., MIL-H-46855B (5)], and a definitive Military Standard, [e.g., MIL-STD14720 (9)). These directives should be applied to achieve an effective integration of
man into the development of military systems, equipment, and facilities. With all
these documents governing its policies, DOD
has the upper hand in applying HF in most
areas throughout the entire research and
development process.
The application of HF at NASA on the Space
Station Freedom Program is governed by
Revision A ofNASA-STD-3000 (3) primarily
developed for flight hardware, and the basic
Man-Systems Integration Standards (MSIS)
(2). However, this documentation does not
cover all HF applications. A supplement,
Human Engineering Handbook for Safety
Assurance NSS 1740.XX (Preliminary) (4),
is being evaluated to determine its potential
to bridge the gap between Safety and Human Factors. This handbook would provide
Safety with the added benefits of Human
Factors analytical techniques that can assist in identifying error-producing situations, thus helping to reduce the poU!ntial
for accidents. By evaluating suggested applications prior 00 the official release of the
handbook, an opportunity is presented 00
evaluate the effectiveness of the suggested
procedures and to provide timely feedback
in the form ofrecommendations for improving the handbook.

oped and enacted by DOD.
If Human Factors principles are not applied
00 facilities, such as the SSPF, and 00 equipment, such as the heavy-lift crane, resulting
safety problems can contribute 00 serious accidents and/or costly delays. This point can be
illustrated by the mishap on the Magellan
Spacecraft that occurred while it was being
prepared for launch. In October of 1988 in a
Flight Hardware Processing Facility at KSC,
maintenance personnel performed a service
operation on a piece of flight hardware. During this operation, a technician was required
00 make three very difficult blind connections.
These circumstances combined with
other factors contributed to an incident
causing a fire that consumed all the combustible wire harness material from the connect.or back to the battery. This resulted in a
costly delay.
A summary of the Magellan Mishap Investigation(FigurelO)identifiessomeofthemajor
incident contributors and categorizes each
incident contributor as 00 its problem type,
and specific area of responsibility by discipline.Although this is flight hardware and we
are dealing exclusively with ground support
hardware, the same type of accident with the
-MishajllnvestOQallOnToomCom:nissionedtopinpointcauses
-Tea.mideolilied.n,,ll~caoseswhictlcontribvtedtotheincidenl

ListedbelowatesomeollheTeam's Findings(Undert)'ingCaUS«I)'

lncldentContnbutorl T)'p9ol'Problems
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MecharicalOesign&
Procedu'alDesign

Whenmismale

ElectricalOesign

=~":':
Keyswi.Udpreventa
partialmatingM>en
a$CO(lpingmating
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Salely/Procedu'al

Design

Electrical&
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ThebOttOmllMaMollrlC$lbylhfl~MishapChietlnvestigalor,

JooR.Busse,{NASA.'GoddardSpaceFlighlCentar),was«Wemu.sr

2. In developing ground based facilities,
NASA is trying to utilize existing components and hardware available as off-theshelf items because these items are less
expensive. Only when it is absolutely essential does NASA develop and underwrite new
items for ground based facilities. From this
desire to minimize cost, NASA is prevented
from totally adopting and implementing the
Human Factors application system devel-

=~FM:NXslrlbothlfleOnlgn.IProc«1unllDevelop-

Figure 10 An Analytical summary of the Magellan
SpaeeerattMlshap

same causes can occur on either type of hardware. From Figure 10, it is apparent that
some of the facOOrs were design induced,
while others resulted from the use of incor-
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rect hardware, and others from the use of
incorrect procedures. This accidentsh ould
not have happened and could have been
prevented through the application ofHuman
Factors.
At the conclusion ofthe mishap investigation,
one ofthe predominant findings stated by Jon
Busse, the Chairman of the Magellan Mishap
Board, was: the lack of Hu.man Factors principles being applied du.ring the design of the
space craft was a significant factor and more
specifically. .

The lack of Human Factors being applied
during the development of the operational
procedures and during the evaluation of essential provisions which are utilized during
bothoperationalservicingandtheperformance
of routine maintenance operations also were
major contributors to this incident.
Conclusion
Maintenance & Safety problems, such as those
we encountered in the SSPF , can be prevented or rectified with the application of
Human Factors principles. To overcome obstacles, such as NASA's cost effective approach, HF specialists must develop creative
new approaches to implement HF at NASA.
These approaches must identify the ways and
means to provide HF in a timely man ner and
on a cost effective basis. Presently, several
candidate methods are under considerat'ion
for implementation.
1) Develop a Designer's Application Guide of
Human Factors Design Principles and incorporate it into NASA's requirements to ensure
consideration of Human Factors. This is essential, because the complexity of many new
systems make it impractical or exceedingly
costly to incorporate changes after items are
produced.
2) Develop effective Human Factors purchasing specifications, stressing maintainability, operability, accessibility, and other
important HF principles to augment KSCDE-512-SM (1). These specifications would
help to eliminate maintenance problems such
as the restricted clearance found in t he new
crane (Figure 7 & 8).
3) Develop and utilize a systematic means to
apply Human Factors in the preparation of
Operational Procedures.
4) Develop a Human Factors modeling tech-

nique for conducting Human Engineering
evaluations in conjunction with Engineering
Prototyping in a Computer Aided Design
(CAD) environment. Currently, a 3-0 Animated Design Visualization Modeling Program is used as an aid for facility design. A
shortcoming of this model is t hat the software's
mannequins can not effectively demonstrate
the man-machine interface because they can
not be animated to perform selected tasks.
The mannequins are static and act only as
scaled props. Therefore, the influence of a 3D Animated Model has great potential for
enhancing the Design Visualization and Human Factors E ngineering design capability.
Presently, HF prototyping can be accomplished in a Computer Aided Design (CAD)
environment, through the use of an anthropometric modeling software called JACK.
This software can be used to evaluate a variety of human factors concerns, ergonomic
issues, biomechanical issues, and specific manmachine interfaces. This can be accomplished
by using an animated mannequin to demonstrate the follow ing:
(1) Reach and space relationships

(2) Man-machine visual links
(3) Performance of selected operational
and maintenance tasks
(4) Workspace requirements a nd operational tolerance, and
(5) Body sizing constraints
Currently, it is feasible to conduct electronic
HF simulations of specific workspaces by utilizing scaled mannequins to perform selected
activities. Activities that a re to be evaluated
would be chosen on a criticality and/or high
risk basis. The electronic Mrun through" of the
activit ies is an inexpensive way to identify
design problems and potential hazards.
Theanthropometricmoclelingsoftwarewould
take advantage of the computer resources
presently available at KSC, such as Space
Station Freedom's facility details stored in
electronic data bases on NASA's Intergraph
CAD system. Through the application of HF
in the design and developmentofsystemsand
facilities, this software could reduce accident
situations due to human error.
This modeling capabilit y is currently under
development in an early prototype stage. The
init ial effort will allow engineering designs
and models to be moved from the KSC
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Intergraph Workstations to a Silicon Graphics Onyx/2RE 2 Workstation.
We have demonstrated that Operability,
Maintainabifity and Safety problems can be
identified by a Human Factors Specialist and
that these problems can be rectified through
the development of creative new approaches
to implementing Human Factors principles.
Possible approaches include the development
of Human Factors purchasing specifications,
designerapplicationguides,systematicmeans
to apply Human Factors to operations and the
use of a 3-D animated design visualization
modeling program. Failure to improve or apply sound Human Factors principles to ground
based facilities and equipment at KSC can be
costly and dangerous, such as the fire on
Magellan. Although our pilot program is not
complete, to date it demonstrates that Human Factors in a supportive role can assist
NASA Safety in the reduction and/or elimination of accident situations due to human er-

References:
1.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration KSC-DE-512SM, Revision
B. Guide for Design Engineering of

Ground Support Equipment and Facilities for Use at Kennedy Space Center. June 1988.
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA-STD-3000, Vols. I, II, &

...

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

IV, Man-Systems Integration Standards (MSIS). October 1989.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA-STD-3000, Vol. IV,
Revision A. Space Station Freedom
Man-Systems Integration Standards.
June 1991.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration NSS 1740.XX. Human Engineering Handbook for Safety
Auurance (Preliminary). September
1993.
U.S. Department of Defense. MIL-H46855B. Military Specification. Human
Engineering Requirements for Military Systems, Equipment, and Facilities. 31 January 1979.
U. S. Department of Defense. Directive
5000. L Defense Acquisition. 02123/
1991.
U.S. Department of Defense. Directive
5000.2. Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures. 02123/
1991.
U. S. Department of Defense. Directive
5000.3. Defense Acquisition ManagementDocumentationandReports. 021
23/1991.
U.S. Department of Defense. MIL-STD1472D. Human Engineering Design
Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment, and Facilities. 20 March 1991.

